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Abstract
We use an incentive model in which improvements to fundamentals
boost the ability of leveraged financial firms (banks) to expand the bal-
ance sheet (as in Adrian and Shin (2010)). The rise in asset prices due to
the amplified response of procyclical systems distorts bankers’ incentives
in providing (costly and non observable) monitoring eﬀort. On the one
hand, the fundamental value of assets positively aﬀects the optimal eﬀort
of the banker, thus allowing supervisory authorities to relax incentive-
compatible capital requirements and boosting asset demand and prices.
On the other hand, in a macro perspective, high prices positively aﬀect
the banker’s payoﬀ in the bad state of asset liquidation (via asset prices),
jeopardizing incentives. This type of externality follows from a purely
“macro” phenomenon a` la Borio (2003) and should be taken into account
by the regulatory authority in designing capital requirements. In procycli-
cal and advanced (low agency costs and highly liquid) financial systems,
incentive compatibility requires a higher capital requirement in the face of
an improvement to fundamentals. Our results provide a theoretical foun-
dation to the countercyclical buﬀer provided for by the Basel Committee.
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1 Introduction
The fact that under certain conditions the financial system contributes with
additional volatility to macroeconomic dynamics is nowadays a shared and well
analyzed view (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), for a recent
survey Panetta et al. (2009)). And indeed, in the aftermath of the crisis, many
analysts, commentators and policymakers blamed the financial industry for their
devastating contribution to the run-up of the crisis.
Financial regulation did also have some responsibilities. Flaws in micro-
prudential rules have in fact provided bankers with head-we-win-tail-they-loose
incentive structures, fostering excessive risk-taking, deterioration of lending
standards and perverse behaviors (Borio (2008); Buiter (2007); Kashyap et al.
(2007); for a discussion, see Cannata and Quagliariello (2009)). In the benev-
olent version, bankers and individual institutions were not perfectly in the po-
sition to foresee the ongoing overheated dynamics and the imminent burst as
they miss a bird’s eye view of the economic system. In this respect, it was up
to policy makers and regulatory authorities to address the problem of external-
ities that arise from the ineﬃcient aggregate outcome of individually optimal
decision-making. And they have failed to do so. While macroprudential issues
were increasingly debated before the eruption of the crisis (Crockett (2000), Bo-
rio (2003)), they were mainly confined to macroprudential analysis, with almost
no room for macroprudential policies, not to mention concrete tools (Clement
(2010)).
To be fair, this aptitude is somehow understandable. First, the actual mag-
nitude of composition fallacies, externalities and procyclicality in the financial
sector was largely underestimated, if at all quantified. Second, the mandate of
central banks (and banking supervisors) rarely included financial stability. For
instance, according Oosterloo and de Haan (2004), in the OECD countries the
responsibility for financial stability was not explicitly formulated in laws and,
in any case, there was considerable heterogeneity in how central banks pursued
financial stability goals.
Against this background, it is not surprising the renewed interest for this is-
sue in the post-crisis debate on the future of financial regulation. The Financial
Stability FSF (2009), clearly stated that a macroprudential orientation focuses
policy on avoiding damage to the financial system as a whole with an eye to the
impact on the real economy. Accordingly, Bernanke (2009) pointed out the need
to combine a systemwide, or macroprudential, perspective with firm-specific risk
analysis to better anticipate problems that may arise from the interactions of
firms and markets. These principles have been transposed in prudential regula-
tion by the Basel Committee (2010). While the system-wide perspective cannot
be circumscribed to it, most of the policy measures focused on procyclicality.
In particular, the Committee introduced countercyclical capital buﬀers above
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minimum capital requirements that banks are required to build-up in buoyant
economic conditions.
A new macroprudential orientation was undoubtedly one of the key blocks
of the reform roadmap and the need for such measures has been unanimously
agreed. Less consensus has been reached on their actual functioning and opera-
tional details though. In practice, it is still controversial what macroprudential
policies are supposed to achieve. On the one hand, the most pragmatic view
advises not to attach excessive emphasis to the potential of such instruments.
Macroprudential tools should just aim at ensuring that financial intermediaries
accumulate suﬃcient resources in good times when they are cheap and risk is
underestimated that can be run-down in bad times with no or little repercus-
sions to financial stability. On the other, according to a more ambitious view,
the macroprudential policy should go hand in hand with monetary policy and
directly aim at managing economic cycles (for a survey, see Galati and Moessner
(2010)).
In our view, this is also due to the lack of appropriate theoretical frame-
works for macroprudential regulation. In this paper, we use an incentive model
in which improvements to fundamentals boost the ability of leveraged financial
firms (banks) to expand the balance sheet (as in Adrian and Shin (2010)). The
rise in asset prices due to the amplified response of procyclical systems distorts
bankers’ incentives in providing (costly and non observable) monitoring eﬀort.
On the one hand, the fundamental value of assets positively aﬀects the optimal
eﬀort of the banker, thus allowing supervisory authorities to relax incentive-
compatible capital requirements and boosting asset demand and prices. On the
other hand, in a macro perspective, high prices positively aﬀect the banker’s
payoﬀ in the bad state of asset liquidation (via asset prices), jeopardizing incen-
tives. This type of externality follows from a purely “macro” phenomenon a` la
Borio (2003) and should be taken into account by the regulatory authority in
designing capital requirements. In procyclical and advanced (low agency costs
and highly liquid) financial systems, incentive compatibility requires a higher
capital requirement in the face of an improvement to fundamentals. Our results
provide a theoretical foundation to the countercyclical buﬀer provided for by
the Basel Committee.
What is peculiar of our model is that it contemplates an externality, and the
need for a policy intervention, as the consequence of improvements to funda-
mentals. Our approach is thus complementary to standard models, which rely
mainly, if not uniquely, on negative (exogenous) shocks and amplification mech-
anisms (see Rochet et al. (1996), Allen and Gale (2004)). We rather follow the
idea of Borio et al. (2001) according to which the business cycle is endogenous
with respect to the collective decisions of financial institutions1. Risk endogene-
ity due to commonality in the financial system and to the market participants’
1According to Borio et al. (2001), those decisions are frequently based on misperceptions
of the evolution of risk over time. The stylized facts are simple. During expansions, inter-
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response to shocks is the key issue of a recent body of literature (Morris and
Shin (2003), Danielsson and Shin (2003)).
Our results provide hints to give a theoretical foundation to the countercycli-
cal buﬀer provided for by the Basel Committee. We show that assets’ market
liquidity and developed financial markets (low agency costs), eventually, increase
the sensitivity of bankers’ incentives to macro shocks and then requires a more
severe scrutiny by macroprudential authorities.
2 The model
In the economy there are three types of agents: (i) banks, (ii) a large number of
market investors (say households, pension funds, etc. and the like) that inelas-
tically accomplish banks funding needs and (iii) final borrowers with profitable
investment opportunities. To strengthen the role of banks, assume borrowers
cannot raise external financing directly from market investors, i.e. bank inter-
mediation is essential2. The role of borrowers is really passive and we often
treat them as securities that can be purchased by banks. All the following con-
siderations hold for the case of firms that are financed with loans or households
that take out mortgages. All agents are risk neutral and do not discount future
cash flow. In the baseline version of the model, market investors are perfectly
competitive so they make zero profits.
There are three dates: 0, 1 and 2. A bank enters date 0 with a given balance
sheet (i.e. a portfolio of securities and a liability structure) and may purchase
new securities at date 1, after raising additional funds from market investors.
For sake of expositional convenience only, we refer to assets that are held by the
bank since date 0 as long-term securities and those purchased at date 1 as short-
term. The supply of short term securities is fixed and exogenous (the economy is
populated by a given amount of final borrowers with finite profitable investment
opportunities). In particular, the date 0 asset side of the balance sheet (initial
endowment) of a bank is made of a > 0 units of (long-term) securities, purchased
before date 0 at a price p0. On the liability side, the equity is e > 0 so that
initial debt is p0a− e.
mediaries tend to underestimate risk exposures to risks, relaxing borrowers selection criteria
and monitoring processes. Accordingly, they also reduce the amount of provisions for fu-
ture losses. After the peak of the cyclical upturn, customers’ profitability worsens, borrowers
creditworthiness deteriorates and losses are revealed. This pattern is often coupled with the
fall of asset prices that, in turn, further aﬀects customers’ financial wealth and depresses the
value of collateral. Banks’ exposures to credit risk increase, thus requiring larger provisions
and higher levels of capital, at the very moment when capital is more expensive or simply
not available. Intermediaries may react by reducing lending, thus exacerbating the eﬀects of
economic downturn.
2This assumption can be easily relaxed without eﬀects on our qualitative results.
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Table 1: Bank’s initial balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
p0a− e, debt
p0a, securities
e, equity
Each security (both long and short term) that is held by a bank at date 1
payoﬀs at date 2 a random amount w˜ with expected value E(w˜) = q, min(w˜) =
q − z > 0 and max(w˜) = q + z, so that z is a measure of the riskiness of the
security. Trivially, q ≥ p0 otherwise long term securities would be not attractive
for banks. Moreover, for a similar argument, we assume throughout the paper
that the market clearing price p of securities at date 1 (see below) is not higher
than q.
At date 0, a bank can either be inactive (maintain its initial balance sheet
until date 2) or try to implement at date 1 a project of acquisition of short
term securities (active bank) to expand the balance sheet (issuing additional
debt to market investors). However, an active bank, with a probability 1 − π,
between date 0 and 1, faces a negative idiosyncratic shock (distress, bad state)
that forces the bank to liquidate the initial holding of long term securities3.
Thereafter, at date 1, a bank in distress tries to sell oﬀ its securities a to some
successful (not distressed) active bank. Due to informational frictions, a bank
that purchases an asset in liquidation must bear a fixed and exogenous cost c
that can be interpreted as a measure of the asset market liquidity (the higher
c, the less liquid the market). It follows that securities in liquidation are traded
in equilibrium if and only if the market price p is higher than c (they would be
traded at the discount price p− c)4.
Each bank is run by a banker that is aﬀected by a moral hazard problem
(for a similar incentive problem, see for instance Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)).
Banker’s eﬀort y aﬀects the probability of distress. In particular, the probability
of distress is 1 − π(y), with π(y) = y and y ∈ (0, 1). However, eﬀort implies
private costs d(y) = y2/2 for the banker. The eﬀort level is not observable.
3This can be the case as an active bank should simultaneously (i) search for short term se-
curities (say, evaluate new would be borrowers) and (ii) monitor long term securities (preserve
the value of its initial asset holdings)
4Note that at date 1 long and short term securities are perfectly identical so that the fact
that long term securities from banks in liquidation are traded at the price p− c represents a
non arbitrage condition.
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Figure 1: The timing of events in the model.
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According to risk neutrality, the expected utility of an active banker is
U = y [(q − p)x+ (q − p0)a] + (1− y)γ(p− c)a− y
2
2
(1)
where γ = 0 when securities in liquidation are not traded (i.e. p < c) or
γ = 1 (otherwise). The term (q − p)x + (q − p0)a is the expected payoﬀ from
a portfolio of x short- and a long-term securities if the banker avoids distress.
Conversely γ(p − c)a is the payoﬀ of the banker in liquidation. The expected
utility of an inactive banker is
U = (q − p0)a
In general, the banker maximizes her utility subject to two constraints: the
first one is the amount of short term securities to purchase at date 1 (if success-
ful) that follows from the maximization of the value of the bank’s portfolio under
a Value-at-Risk constraint (see below). Secondly, as active banker faces a posi-
tive probability of distress and this probability is decreasing in the eﬀort, there
exists a minimum eﬀort level that guarantees that the project of asset acquisi-
tion is not value-destroying with respect to the strategy of remaining inactive.
As we will see below, one can alternatively imagine that the role of designing
incentive compatibility constrained follows purely from market discipline or is
assigned to a prudential regulation authority.
2.1 Optimal bank’s balance sheet
Let’s first derive the optimal (date 1) balance sheet position for the bank, and
then turn to incentive considerations. We follow Adrian and Shin (2010) assum-
ing that, for a successful bank (an active bank that does not experience distress
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between date 0 and date 1), the optimal amount of short term securities x to
purchase is derived from the maximization of the date 2 value of the bank’s
portfolio under a Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraint:
max E (w˜(x+ a)) such that VaR ≤ e (2)
The VaR constraint stipulates that the bank’s equity is large enough so that
the default probability is kept below some benchmark level. Default would
occur when, at date 2, the value of the bank’s assets is lower than the value of
the bank’s debt (i.e. (p0a − e) + px) towards market investors. With no loss
of generality, assume that the benchmark default level is zero. Then the VaR
constraint is
(q − z)(x+ a) ≥ (p0a− e) + px
or, rearranging terms:
e− {[p− (q − z)]x+ [p0 − (q − z)]a} ≥ 0
where [p− (q − z)]x+ [p0 − (q − z)] > 0 is the worst case loss on a portfolio
x+ a. As the value of the portfolio is increasing in x, at the optimum the VaR
constraint is always binding. Solving for x, we get the demand for short term
securities for a bank with equity e:
x =
e− (p0 − q + z)a
p− q + z (3)
The optimal portfolio is increasing in the equity e, in the fundamental q and
decreasing in the price p and risk z. In this sense, the demand for assets purely
follows from initial endowments and fundamentals and the banker is left with
no discretion on it.
2.2 Incentive compatibility and capital requirements
The banker’s optimal eﬀort level derives from banker’s utility maximization.
From the first order condition of equation (1), the optimal eﬀort level y∗ is
y∗ = (q − p)x+ [(q − p0)− γ(p− c)]a (4)
where, once again, the demand x for assets follows from equation (3). The
demand x and the expected return q − p are both disciplinary devices for the
banker and increase the optimal eﬀort. The amount a of initial assets (long term
securities) plays a similar role. On the other hand, the possibility to extract a
positive payoﬀ (p−c)a in liquidation lowers the optimal eﬀort. Above all, and as
we will see more in details below, the market clearing price jeopardizes banker’s
incentives: it decreases the good state payoﬀ and increases the bad state one.
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Let’s turn now to the constraint on the minimal eﬀort that is necessary to
avoid value destruction. Define y¯ as the eﬀort level at which the expected (date
2) value of the portfolio of a bank that performs the asset acquisition equals
the value of an inactive bank with identical equity. In other words, y¯ is the
minimum eﬀort such that the balance sheet expansion does not destroy value
in expectations. The condition is:
y¯q(x+ a) = qa
and, rearranging terms:
y¯ =
a
x+ a
(5)
Only bankers whose (optimal) eﬀort is larger than y¯ should be allowed to
be active and (if not in distress) participate to asset acquisition and expand
the balance sheet. Indeed, imagine the banker’s optimal eﬀort is y∗ < y¯. In
this case, the project of asset acquisition decreases the expected value of the
bank as the probability of distress (1 − y) is too large to compensate for the
expected additional value from asset acquisition. Moreover, as the optimal eﬀort
is an increasing function of the demand of short term securities given by the
equation (4), the condition on the minimum incentive compatible eﬀort can be
easily arranged as a condition on the minimum incentive compatible x. Only
banks whose demand x is larger than x¯ are allowed to be active. The cut-oﬀ
x¯ is decreasing in q and increasing in p. Finally, as the demand of short term
securities is linearly increasing in equity e, incentive compatibility constraint
can be reformulated as a condition on the equity.
The banker’s incentive compatibility constraint e ≥ e¯ can be interpreted
as a capital requirement: only banks meeting that requirement are allowed to
participate in the date 1 trading on short term securities5.
Graph 1 clearly depicts how the capital requirement would work in practice.
Each bank is endowed with a certain amount of capital e, which determines its
ability (quantity) to subscribe assets under the VaR constraint. The quantity
of assets (x), in turn, is the driver of the bank’s optimal eﬀort. However, as
we mentioned, the supervisory authority does not allow bankers to carry on
investments that lead to value destruction (i.e., the creation of value is the
final policy objective). In other words, the authority requires banks to put
a minimum eﬀort and pursues this intermediate objective setting a minimum
capital requirement (the policy instrument). In what follows, we use x¯ as a
proxy of the capital requirement as it is linearly and positively related to e¯.
5Note that in principle, market investors may also impose a minimum eﬀort (through
requiring banks to hold at least e¯), making prudential regulation useless (or redundant).
However, it is well known that in the banking sector, due to the presence of small-sized
depositors and the moral hazard linked to deposit-insurance schemes, market discipline is less
eﬀective and needs to be complemented by capital regulations.
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Graph 1: The derivation of the capital requirement e¯.
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2.3 Fundamentals and incentives without procyclicality
In this section we analyze the eﬀects of an improvement to fundamentals on
incentives, maintaining the ad hoc assumption that the eﬀects of the shock on
asset prices are negligible. We remove this assumption in the next section. For
now, assume a (negative but almost flat) relationship between x¯ and the clearing
price p (the asset market clearing curve - AMCC) and that this relationship is
independent from q. In other terms, as in Graph 2, we restrict the analysis
to a situation in which financial firms’ response to shocks does not exhibit
amplification properties and the associated eﬀect on asset demand and prices is
moderate.
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Then, an improvement of q shifts the optimal eﬀort curve y∗ upward and
makes it steeper. The demand x and thus the equity of marginal bankers
(bankers whose optimal eﬀort equals the cut-oﬀ y¯) decreases: the minimum
incentive compatible equity decreases. In the regulatory interpretation, in the
expanding phase of the cycle, the minimum capital requirement declines as
booming conditions boost eﬀort and incentives are more easily aligned.
Graph 2: The eﬀects of a positive shock to q, absent procyclicality
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It is interesting to point out that, while the incentive-compatible capital
requirement used in our model is extremely simplified (and very far from actual
prudential rules), it still shows some characteristics that make it consistent
with the Basel II risk-sensitive regulation. In particular, the time-dynamics is
similar, with the minimum capital requirement decreasing in good times – as
the consequence of increasing payoﬀs in good states (our model) and decreasing
risk-weights (Basel II) – and decreasing in bad times. In other word, our model
is able to replicate Basel II cyclicality, even though via diﬀerent drivers. In this
respect, Basel II regulation is microprudential in the sense that as it disregards
the feedback eﬀect that macro variables (i.e. changes in asset prices) exert on
banks’ behavior.
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2.4 Fundamentals and asset prices with procyclicality
In the analysis of the previous section we disregarded the second part of the
story, namely the link that goes from fundamentals to prices and, finally, to
incentives. In this section we investigate the first part of the chain, namely the
link between fundamentals and prices.
Graph 3 shows the three eﬀects that determine the amplified response of
prices. First of all, the improvement q￿ moves the optimal eﬀort curve and
the VaR constraint. The relationship in the bottom left quadrant shows the
mass of active banks as a function of the capital requirement: assume banks are
heterogenous with respect to equity, and the population of banks is distributed
with cumulative distribution function G(e); then 1−G(e¯) is the mass of active
banks. Adrian and Shin (2010) shows, in a very similar setting, that leveraged
financial institutions’ demand for assets generates an amplified response of asset
prices to shocks to fundamentals. Their eﬀect goes uniquely through the VaR
eﬀect (see Graph 3). This mechanism is at work in our model as well. Moreover,
in our setting, the price response is amplified through diﬀerent and additional
channels.
An improvement of q
• Increases the optimal eﬀort y∗ for each bank6, decreasing the probability
of distress and increasing the mass of successful banks (eﬀort eﬀect). The
eﬀort eﬀect shifts the AMCC curve outward.
• Increases the optimal demand x(e) for each bank7(VaR eﬀect). The VaR
eﬀect makes the AMCC curve steeper.
• Decreases the capital requirement e¯, enlarging the mass of active banks
(capital requirement eﬀect). The capital requirement eﬀect shifts the
AMCC curve outward.
Those three eﬀects guarantee an amplified response of p to q: following an
improvement in fundamentals, the price displays an amplified response. We refer
to this property of the system as procyclicality. According to these considera-
tion, the AMCC becomes steeper and moves outward following the endogenous
amplified response of prices to fundamentals.
6From equation (4), ∂y∗/∂q > 0.
7From equation (3), ∂x/∂q > 0.
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Graph 3: Amplification mechanisms of the price response to fundamentals.
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2.5 Asset prices and incentives with procyclicality
From equation (4), besides the consolidated positive relationship between q
and y, the optimal eﬀort is negatively related to the price of assets: higher
prices decrease good state payoﬀs and increase bad state ones. Note that the
banker is able to extract utility both from purchasing assets and holding them
to maturity or from the resale in the case of liquidation. When the bank avoids
distress (good state) and participates to date 1 assets’ purchase, a higher price
lowers the return (q−p) on assets. Moreover, a higher price increases the payoﬀ
of the banker in the case of distress and liquidation. In other terms the value
of eﬀort decreases with p as the banker is able to extract decreasing incomes
in good states and increasing incomes in bad states. These two negative eﬀects
jeopardize incentives.
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Graph 4: The eﬀects of a positive shock to q, with procyclicality
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Graph 4 shows the full picture of a shock to fundamentals. When the system
is procyclical, the AMCC responds to q (blue curve) becoming steeper and shift-
ing downward. The associated price shift feeds back pulling down the optimal
eﬀort curve (top panel). The higher the price response, the larger the downward
shift of the optimal eﬀort.
Capital requirements should embed the overall system response to the shock.
Procyclical financial systems need higher capital requirements to preserve in-
centives. Indeed note that were the capital requirement not to move at all, or
to decline in the style of Basel II (e¯(q￿, p)), there would be a positive mass of
active banks whose optimal eﬀort is well below y¯ (they destroy value). In this
case, eﬀective eﬀort would be much lower than expected, and massive (unex-
pected) liquidation would become a real possibility. Beside the plunge in asset
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prices, and putting the argument a little forward, the eﬀective cost of liquida-
tion p − c would be very large8. The eﬀort in booming times, absent a proper
policy intervention, would be in fact lower than in normal times.
In sum, what microprudential regulation misses is the feedback eﬀect that
changes in asset prices (due to the -amplified- response to improvements of q)
exert on incentives. In other terms, microprudential regulation - not to mention
market participants - is unable to appreciate that higher asset prices reduce
banks’ eﬀort9.
The eﬀects described above resemble Borio et al. (2001)’s idea that the credit
cycle is endogenous with respect to the collective decisions of financial institu-
tions10. And indeed our model shows - admittedly in a simplified setting - that
the forces that lead to the upswing carry the seeds of the subsequent down-
swing. In that respect, we are aligned with the spirit of Minsky (1992) financial
instability hypothesis, which does not rely upon exogenous shocks to generate
business cycles fluctuations (and financial instability), and with the more recent
work of Bhattacharya (2010).
In the full picture, the policy response to a positive shock to fundamentals
is simple. As proposed in Basel III, the undesirable consequences of too low
capital requirements in good times can be mitigated by macroprudential buﬀers.
Incentive compatible regulation should thus ensure that the eﬀort is reinforced
in extremely favorable conditions via higher capital requirements, which take the
form of macroprudential add-ons (in the model, the quantity e(x¯(q￿, p∗))−e(x¯).
Finally, from equation (4), the role of c, namely the loss of value of an
asset in the case of liquidation, performs a subtle role. Very generally, c is
inversely related to the asset market liquidity (the easiness to find a buyer
without significant discounts on the sale price). Then, the sensitivity of banker’s
incentives to p is magnified when asset market liquidity is high. Indeed, the
lower c, the wider the region in the price space in which the market clearing
price is larger than c (so that γ = 1 and the payoﬀ in liquidation is positive).
It follows that, given those previously mentioned amplification eﬀects, asset
market liquidity contributes to give an additional boost to the sensitivity of
incentives to prices (and thus to fundamentals).
8In our simplified framework we maintain the assumption that c, namely the inverse of
asset market liquidity, is given and exogenous. One can easily imagine that liquidity would
suddenly dry up (c increases) in the case of a sharp fall in asset prices associated to bad news
concerning the quality of banks’ portfolios. The latter would reinforce the eﬀect of the fall in
prices, dramatically reducing p− c.
9The growth of the subprime market and securitization in the US in 2002-07 is a vivid and
recent example; in particular, it can be truly problematic to appreciate the negative distortion
of incentives induced by higher payoﬀs in liquidation induced by increasing asset prices; many
argue that the deterioration of lending standard has been largely determined by the belief that
increasing real estate prices would have continued to provide a floor to the value of assets.
10According to Borio et al. (2001), those decisions are frequently based on misperceptions
of the evolution of risk over time.
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3 Conclusions
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, a lively debate on the cyclicality of finan-
cial regulation and the possible options for mitigating it took place among policy
makers, regulators and the industry. The outcome has been an unanimous call
for a macroprudential approach to regulation. However, the discussion has been
largely on the policy side, while the theoretical underpinnings of macropruden-
tial devices have been generally neglected.
In this paper, we set up an incentive model in which banks face – beyond
endogenous constraints to asset demand – a capital regulation that also aﬀects
their ability to subscribe new assets. The objective of capital regulation is to
ensure that banks put a minimum eﬀort in their monitoring activities, thus
avoiding too risky investments. Banks’ eﬀort is aﬀected both by micro and
macro variables. While our aim is not to setup a general framework for banking
regulation as we concentrate only on one aspect of it, the model sheds some
light on how microprudential rules (those that disregard the feedback eﬀect
of macro variables on incentives) may pose – particularly in benign economic
conditions – wrong incentives to banks and suggests that a macro-perspective
may be deemed necessary.
The starting point of the model is a positive macro shock to fundamentals
(say, an improvement of assets expected return) that boosts the ability of banks
to expand the balance sheet (Adrian and Shin (2010)). In fact, extremely favor-
able financial conditions aﬀect bankers’ incentives. On the one hand, expected
returns increase and banks’ optimal monitoring eﬀorts also improve. Since banks
are expected to voluntarily (endogenously) put higher eﬀort, (microprudential)
capital requirements decrease. Lower capital requirements would add to other
endogenous mechanisms and boost the demand for assets. Indeed, booming de-
mand is the result of the procyclical nature of leveraged financial institutions’
behavior. Unfortunately, the soar in prices feeds back on incentives and, due
to the amplified response, more than countervails the initial direct eﬀect of the
improvement of fundamentals: this implies that the eﬀort in booming times is in
fact lower than in normal times and that stricter – not more lenient – capital re-
quirements would be needed to avoid perverse behavior and value destruction.
Finally, asset market liquidity (the easiness to liquidate assets in the case of
distress due to poor monitoring eﬀort) and financial markets development (low
agency costs, embedded here in the banker monitoring cost function) increase
the sensitivity of bankers’ incentives to asset prices so that both procyclical and
advanced financial systems require a more severe scrutiny by macroprudential
authorities. While the model is very simplified, the mechanisms it envisages are
fully consistent with what happened before and during the big financial crisis.
There are two important policy implications of these results. First, banks
plant in favorable conditions the seeds for future problems. In the dynamic
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version of the story, the initial improvement in fundamentals (that ameliorates
incentives) is quickly coupled with the increase in the asset prices (that jeop-
ardize incentives). In this expanding phase, absent proper policy intervention
on capital requirements, the incentive distortion is under way. Therefore, it
is key that a macroprudential capital buﬀer is added to microprudential capi-
tal requirements to align incentives through the business cycle. Our evidence
provides thus strong theoretical support for the Basel III countercyclical buﬀer.
Second, eﬀective macroprudential policies should not only aim at the accu-
mulation of reserves to be used when, somehow exogenously, “bad times arrive”.
Rather, they stand as eﬀective policy tools to correct a class of distortions as-
sociated with the mutual reinforcing interaction between leveraged institutions
balance sheet positions and increasing asset prices. The realignment of incen-
tives may however require severe buﬀer levels and their costs in terms of credit
supply should not be neglected. We leave this as an open issue for future re-
search.
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